Boosting Japan’s “Proactive Contributions to Peace”

Prime Minister Abe Shinzō returned to office in 2012 with a promise to change Japan. Looking at his term thus far and his efforts to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, revise his country’s security policies, and pursue difficult economic reforms, Abe has already proven to be one of Japan’s most transformative premiers. This year, after a speech to Congress and a seventieth anniversary statement marking the end of World War II, he even successfully addressed the historical ghosts of Imperial Japan’s wrongdoings. Perhaps more than anything else, he has drawn attention for his successful effort to pass a package of security-related bills.

Abe has pursued most of his international efforts under the banner of “proactive contributions to peace.” While this slogan has become part of the discourse in Abe’s Japan, there has been little examination of whether his actions translate into contributions to peace that differ substantially from those of his predecessors, who relied primarily on various forms of financial assistance. In reviewing the prime minister’s record, it is clear that Japan has not lived up to the heightened expectations that Abe’s rhetoric has generated—except in cases involving China, when Japan’s security has been directly affected. Unless Japan makes more substantial contributions in dealing with problems in which it does not have such a direct stake, Tokyo risks disappointing the international community for not playing an international role commensurate with its international standing and capabilities.

Pushing for a Proactive Japan

From its inception, the Abe administration pushed the notion of Japan becoming a “Proactive Contributor to Peace.” It formally laid this out in December 2013 with its National Security Strategy:

The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. It is thus necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

The vision is clear: Japan’s strategic intention is to proactively engage in international affairs. The implication is that Japan has not done much heretofore; hence the emphasis is on the need to play an even more proactive role. Abe’s aim was to change this situation and make Japan less a security consumer and more a security provider.

The assumption underlying Abe’s vision has been that no country in the world can secure its peace and security by itself. In a September CNN op-ed, Abe recognized “that individual countries acting alone are not enough to maintain global peace and stability.” Having experienced the 1990s, when Japan was criticized for relying on “checkbook diplomacy,” Abe recognizes that the international community expects Japan to play a role in international affairs commensurate with its national capabilities and international standing.

In the two decades since the Gulf War, Japan’s international involvements have gradually evolved away from purely financial or in-kind contributions toward more proactive contributions to peace and security, although they were never called that. Whether it was antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, helping reconstruction efforts in Iraq, refueling coalition ships engaged in operations in Afghanistan, providing humanitarian and disaster relief, or participating in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations, Japanese leadership found non-financial ways to contribute to international affairs in ways commensurate with Japan’s national capabilities. But these were always the exceptions, rather than the rule, and the legislative process enabling those missions was often excruciating, with Diet deliberations focusing more on minute details than national interests and broad policy objectives.

Abe has not only continued this evolution, he has also made important changes that should enable Japan to make greater contributions in the future. For instance, Abe has expanded Japan’s ability to export defense equipment and engage in international defense projects. He has also issued a new interpretation of Japan’s constitution that enable Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to engage in a wider range of missions, including coming to the defense of other countries even if Japan itself is not attacked. Moreover, Abe increased the number of strategic partnerships with regional countries and further deepened security ties with like-minded democracies such as Australia and India. He also sought closer ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and NATO and continues to place a premium on participation in multinational venues including the United Nations, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and Asian Development Bank.

Similarities

It is important to note that many of Abe’s efforts have direct correlates to initiatives begun under his predecessor, Noda Yoshihiko. Despite the broad, negative brushstrokes held both in Japan and elsewhere of the Democratic Party of Japan’s three years in power under three prime ministers, the Noda Administration was qualitatively different from those of Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto. Noda steered Japan toward greater activity in international affairs. He announced Japan’s interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership; revised Japan’s arms export principles; initiated a wide number of strategic partnerships with regional powers; drew Japan closer to the United States and other like-minded democracies; and strongly advocated Japan’s interpretation of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), both bilaterally and in multinational venues, to counter China’s interpretation and its aggressive actions in the East and South China Seas.

Regardless of these similarities, the important question is whether Abe’s initiatives have resulted in proactive contributions to peace that are qualitatively different from those by Noda or other prime ministers. In other words, has Abe lessened Japan’s dependence on financial contributions in favor of increased contributions in other forms, such as Japanese civilians, noncombat SDF, or normative leadership? An examination of the Abe administration’s track record in reacting to major security events thus far reveals that old practices remain intact.

In the current fight against ISIS, for instance, while about a dozen countries are directly involved in airstrikes and dozens more are providing support with manpower and/or logistical assistance, Japan has yet to make a contribution that includes non-combat personnel—despite Abe’s vow “to hold [the terrorists] responsible for their deplorable acts” (ISIS killed two Japanese nationals earlier this year). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, Japan’s main efforts against ISIS include strengthening counterterrorism measures, including $15.5 million in counterterrorism capacity building assistance, enhancing diplomacy to foster greater Middle East stability and prosperity, including $200 million in nonmilitary assistance to support countries battling ISIS, and other aid to help make societies resilient to radicalization.

Related to the fight against ISIS has been the global response to refugees fleeing Iraq and Syria. At a time when other industrialized democracies are opening their doors to tens of thousands of refugees—with Germany accepting hundreds of thousands—Japan remains closed. In 2014, Japan accepted only 11 refugees out of 5,000 seeking such status. Japan’s main tool for dealing with refugees remains money. Japan is a top-tier donor to the UN High Commission on Refugees, giving $181.6 million in 2014. To deal with the current refugee crisis, Abe pledged $1.5 billion in emergency aid during his visit to the UN in September. As the United States and NATO struggle over how many refugees they will take and how quickly, Abe’s statement that “there are many things that we should do before accepting immigrants” does not resonate with Japan’s friends and allies.

Similarly, in the fight against Ebola, Japan’s contributions were almost exclusively financial, with $173 million in assistance as well as in-kind contributions (such as test kits, ambulances, medical supplies, thermometers, and other equipment). Japan’s presence in on-the-ground relief activities was underwhelming. While the United States and United Kingdom sent large numbers of military personnel, the EU assisted with airlifting supplies from Europe, and even Cuba sent close to 500 doctors and nurses to engage in relief activities on the ground, Japan sent fewer than 30 doctors, liaison officers, and other advisors.

None of these efforts under Abe were qualitatively different from those of previous Japanese premiers. All were heavy on financial assistance and void of large-scale contributions of personnel, civilian or military. Indeed, the only outliers in Abe’s response to international events have been his actions to counter an increasingly assertive China in the East and South China Seas.

Militarily, Abe has accelerated efforts to strengthen the defense of Japan’s southwestern islands, acquiring new assets and reconfiguring the SDF’s defense posture to better monitor Chinese maritime activities, complicate China’s ability to gain control of the East China Sea or Japanese islands within it, and improve Japan’s ability to withstand—and potentially halt—a small-scale contingency. He has also moved to strengthen Japan’s alliance with the United States, enhance security ties with Australia and India, and expand strategic ties with Southeast Asian states. He has actively supported capacity building of Southeast Asia’s maritime entities, including coast guard training and donations of high-tech equipment and patrol boats. Economically, his administration successfully negotiated the TPP, which is seen as a way to challenge China’s economy. Importantly, the Abe administration has demonstrated normative leadership, strongly advocating rule of law, particularly maritime law. Nowhere is this truer than in Japan’s efforts to build a unified backing of Japan’s interpretation of the UNCLOS among Southeast Asian countries to make it more difficult for China to deal bilaterally with states with which it has territorial disputes. These actions aim to expand Japan’s strategic space vis-à-vis China; they also represent a very proactive Japan.

Make no mistake, Japan provides crucial support to the international community through its financial and in-kind assistance. None of what is presented here is intended to diminish Japan’s contributions in these areas.

Heightened Expectations

Abe’s rhetoric, however, has heightened expectations that Japan will make contributions closer, if not comparable, to those of other major countries. Since Abe’s responses to major international security events that do not involve China have been similar to those of his predecessors—and fall short of the rhetoric—Japan risks disappointing the international community. Worse, the exception that Tokyo makes in responding to China seems to indicate a willingness to contribute robustly to international security problems only when Japan is directly affected. The prime minister may not personally feel this way, but the optics are not in his favor as his actions can easily lead to the interpretation that a fire on a distant shore is not Tokyo’s concern. So, too, does the fact that Japanese leaders continuously emphasize the strict limitations on Japan’s ability to conduct overseas operations, even after the recent enactment of new security legislation.

In a May 2014 speech at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, the prime minister asked a rhetorical question: How should Japan contribute to the pursuit of “peace and prosperity in Asia, for evermore”? The idea of Japan, an advanced civilian power, proactively contributing to peace is a positive development. Attempts to address regional and global security challenges would benefit from more active Japanese contributions, both physical and normative. If Abe were to deal with international problems in the way he has with China, we would see an approach utilizing all the tools Japan has available—but we do not. At least not yet. Perhaps a little more time is necessary; after all, the security legislation still needs to be operationalized and SDF personnel trained under the new rules. Until Abe takes such an approach, the international community will miss seeing Japan make proactive contributions to peace commensurate with its national capabilities and international standing.

Finding Ways to Boost Contributions

Since Prime Minister Abe returned to office in 2012, he has been advocating that Japan become a “Proactive Contributor to Peace.” Similar to the “Normal Japan” argument that became part of the discourse in the 1990s, “Proactive Contributor to Peace” has become the narrative of Abe’s Japan. Are Japan’s international contributions today, however, qualitatively different than they were during prior administrations? After all, when one looks at the major security challenges that the international community has been confronting during Prime Minister Abe’s tenure—ISIS, Syrian refugees, Ebola—Japan’s primary response has been financial assistance. With new security legislation in place and a premier more willing to advocate Japan’s contributions on the world stage, Prime Minister Abe has laid a foundation for greater use of manpower and normative leadership. Below are a number of opportunities to be more proactive, both immediately and once the recently passed security legislation is operationalized and personnel are trained under the new rules. Importantly, these are all areas on which Japan can cooperate with the United States, thereby fulfilling a dual purpose of strengthening alliance relations.

Become a leader in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and medical emergencies.

Japan has a track record of providing manpower in human welfare situations, largely in Asia, but Prime Minister Abe should strive to make Japan the gold standard for how advanced, civilian powers respond globally. In addition to providing emergency relief goods and aid, he could deploy the Self-Defense Forces—which have logistic capabilities and experience in medical assistance, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction—as well as interdisciplinary, civilian Japan Disaster Relief teams with expertise in search and rescue/recovery and medical support. Together, these resources could position Japan as a civilian power that responds quickly to emergencies worldwide, particularly after the SDF begins flying its new, long-range C-2 transport plane. Given that these missions are purely noncombat, they should encounter no legal troubles.

More actively support capacity building of Southeast Asia’s maritime entities.

Over the past decade, Japan has engaged in capacity building programs for many ASEAN members. These efforts include donating three patrol boats to Indonesia, transferring high-tech equipment to the Philippines, and assisting various coast guard training programs. The Abe administration has also pledged to donate six used, nonmilitary vessels to Vietnam, modified for patrol tasks, and agreed to supply a fleet of ten new patrol vessels to the Philippines. With the relaxed weapons export rules and revisions in Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, Prime Minister Abe should expand the menu of options for capacity building in the South China Sea. One possibility is to transfer used Japan Coast Guard and Maritime SDF equipment and technology to friendly states, such as Singapore or Indonesia. This move should go beyond patrol boats to include aircraft and support ships. Another possibility is to construct training, maintenance, and support facilities, and send JCG and MSDF officers to these countries to handle training and maintenance responsibilities for any vessel or aircraft that Japan provides.

Construct a new paradigm for assisting people from developing nations.

Prime Minister Abe said in his CNN op-ed, “Over the last 60 years, Japan has been a partner for developing countries, extending much-needed assistance to develop human resources and infrastructure while also respecting and understanding their specific needs.” Undoubtedly Japan’s assistance has been crucial for many countries. However, it is time for Japan to go further. Not all people from the developing world benefit from assistance. For a host of reasons, many people from both conflict and nonconflict zones choose to flee their countries and seek refugee status in more advanced, stable democracies. It is time for Japan to follow its Western counterparts, and lead its Asian counterparts, by proactively increasing the number of refugees it accepts. With the Ministry of Justice having recently eased its criteria for recognizing refugees, the prime minister needs to show the world Japan’s willingness to be a leader in ameliorating this human challenge. After all, it was Prime Minister Abe who said, in the same CNN op-ed, that the refugee situation “is a serious humanitarian crisis that underscores the need for greater international cooperation. Japan stands firm with host communities of refugees and we will do our best to tackle this challenge.”

Make Japan a normative leader.

Japanese normative leadership at an international level is relatively scarce. Yet, more than any other Japanese leader before him, Prime Minister Abe has attempted to demonstrate international leadership. His National Security Strategy states, “Japan must have the power to take the lead in setting the international agenda . . . without being confined to a reactive position to events and incidents after they have already occurred.” Nothing sums up this thinking better than his administration’s promotion of the rule of law. In his May 2014 speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, he said, “Japan for the rule of law, Asia for the rule of law, and the rule of law for all of us.” Japan needs to participate in international rule-making from the planning stages and provide more human capital to international judicial institutions. Functionally, there is an opportunity to lead efforts regarding cyberspace, outer space, and the maritime realm. The latter offers the best opportunity, given the Prime Minister’s repeated emphasis on UNCLOS. Whether bilaterally or multilaterally, the Abe administration has been a leading advocate for its interpretation (as well as America’s) of UNCLOS. Given his continued emphasis on rule of law, Prime Minister Abe is perfectly poised to ramp up his promotion of UNCLOS in all relevant organizations as well as in bilateral relationships. As part of this initiative, he should exercise Japan’s right to conduct freedom of navigation operations in international waters by deploying Japanese ships and aircraft on routine patrols and surveillance missions to the South China Sea alongside the United States.

Increase SDF deployments on noncombat missions overseas.

To date, including its current engagement in the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Japan has participated in a total of 13 UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), 5 international humanitarian relief operations, and 9 international election observation operations. With new legislation enabling Japan to participate in a wider range of UN PKOs, it behooves Prime Minister Abe to utilize the SDF as contributors to peace. Currently, there are 16 UN PKO missions. Of these, seven involve monitoring ceasefires or demilitarizing. These are still tricky for Japan, given that they could involve combat if a ceasefire breaks down. However, the remaining nine include protecting civilians and human rights workers, assisting security sector reform, promoting human rights, and helping political processes of weak states. Legally, there should not be any challenges preventing Prime Minister Abe from increasing SDF participation in these missions, up to the legal limit under Japanese law. What is needed, however, is not more light infantry engaging in infrastructure and transportation services. Rather, these PKOs could benefit tremendously from higher-end support, such as logistics, and manpower in new roles, such as force commanders for peacekeeping missions and staff officers at more positions in UN PKO headquarters. Japan could also play a role in re-establishing defense organizations or assisting security sector reforms in weak states.

Consider ways the SDF can support activities that counter threats to international peace and security.

The recently passed security legislation makes it legal for the SDF to conduct operations that support global peace and security. Although not specified, terrorism is a good example of a threat to international peace and security, including Japan’s. Prime Minister Abe has indicated his solidarity with countries fighting terrorism. Yet, Japan needs to assume a greater role in anti-terrorism operations with allied countries. This role does not have to include combat or airstrikes. Instead, the time is ripe for Japan to provide combat service support, for example to the coalition fighting ISIS forces. Arguably, this idea is far from the discourse heard in the Diet during the security legislation deliberations and probably not envisioned as falling under Japan’s constitutional revisions. Yet, similar to Japan’s refueling mission to help coalition forces flying sorties in Afghanistan, there is no reason why the SDF cannot do the same for coalition warplanes targeting ISIS fighters, if refueling takes place in areas where there is no combat. It would, presumably, become easier if the operation were to fall under a future UN resolution.

Opportunities Abound

With the exception of refugees, all of the issues above are considered common areas for cooperation in the April 2015 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The Guidelines enable the alliance to make greater, and more effective, cooperative contributions to international security initiatives that include peacekeeping operations, HA/DR, maritime security, capacity building, and logistic support. As such, the indirect aim of cooperative efforts in these areas is to strengthen alliance ties. And there are plenty of opportunities.

• For UN PKOs, the United States has consistently been under pressure—and international criticism—to provide more of everything: personnel, materials, and leadership. Given Japan’s civilian power identity, it makes sense that Japan should share greater responsibilities in all of this, thereby freeing the United States to focus on areas that demand attention in ways Japan cannot legally help or allowing Japan to develop stronger ties with other US allies engaged in PKOs. This will be particularly true once the new security legislation is operationalized, thereby enabling the SDF to protect UN and other personnel participating in the same UN missions.
• In maritime security, because the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS, its calls for abiding by the convention are often criticized as hypocrisy. As a signatory, Japan has the moral authority to advocate regional support of its interpretation, which is also Washington’s interpretation, as a counter to China’s. Furthermore, if Japan and the United States were to conduct South China Sea freedom of navigation operations, Tokyo and Washington could cover a wider area, thereby enhancing maritime domain awareness and relieving some of the burden on the US Navy. Such operations also demonstrate Japan’s willingness to back up its normative leadership with action.
• In HA/DR, Japan and the United States have shown how effective their combined efforts are in operations following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan that hit the Philippines. There is unlimited potential for the allies in this area, such as greater joint relief efforts, greater information sharing to reduce redundancies in relief assistance, mutual logistic support and operational coordination and planning, and collaboration to establish an emergency information transmission system in Southeast Asia.
• Southeast Asia is home to disputes over territory and maritime boundaries between China and a number of Southeast Asian states. While the United States has a direct interest in these issues due to the existence of two regional allies—the Philippines and Thailand—the United States and Japan share an interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, stable sea lanes of communication, and peaceful resolution of disputes based on the amount of international commercial shipping transiting the region. As such, Japan and the United States have a mutual interest in capacity building of maritime enforcement entities. The allies could coordinate their separate assistance programs to cast as wide a net as possible across all states challenged by China. Such coordination would ensure a broader distribution of coastal patrol vessels and maintenance and training facilities, increased training for maritime law enforcement officials, and better information sharing among national agencies charged with maritime security and maritime law enforcement.
• The United States is pursuing a number of tracks in the fight against ISIS. This includes training rebel fighters and equipping them with military equipment, small arms, ammunition, and non-lethal military gear; building the capacity of the Iraqi government to prepare its forces to fight ISIS and regain territory; and leading a small coalition of Western and Arab states in an aerial campaign against ISIS positions in Syria and Iraq. Understandably, it is extremely difficult for Japan to participate legally in the first two tracks. However, the third track offers Japan an opportunity to cooperate with the United States. Building on Japan’s logistical support of coalition forces flying sorties in Afghanistan, the coalition could benefit from Japanese refueling support. Possible deployment locations include sending Air SDF units to Incirlik and Diyabakir air bases in Turkey, MSDF Mashū-class refueling ships to the Persian Gulf, or ASDF KC-767s to conduct inflight refueling in non-combat airspace. Another possibility would be dispatching E-767 AWACs for early warning and control, perhaps in friendly airspace, like Turkey. Finally, but perhaps less possible, would be dispatching C-130H cargo planes to support humanitarian efforts for refugees in northern Iraq. The coalition forces have already utilized cargo planes to air-drop meals and drinking water to Yazidi refugees. Understandably, however, this may cause legal problems for Japan, as it would likely require fighter jets to protect them from surface-to-air threats. The bottom line is that noncombat, logistical service support activities are possible. All of these would help the coalition.

In sum, Japan already provides crucial support to the Asia-Pacific region and the world through financial aid and in-kind assistance. Prime Minister Abe, however, has sought a new paradigm for his country by making Japan less a security consumer and more a security provider, which he calls proactive contributions to peace. This is vital, as the challenges facing the world are so complex and far-reaching. The countries tackling these challenges would benefit tremendously from Japan’s engagement, beyond financial and in-kind assistance. The recommendations above are a few ideas on where and how Japan can stake out new territory, including many once the necessary statutes are written and training is complete. Importantly, they all represent means by which the United States and Japan can cooperate to address both regional and global security challenges. None is easy; importantly, they are doable in today’s Japan.