From Future Hopes to Today’s Needs: Public Support for the Takaichi Cabinet Sees a Shift

Debate to Drive Support

One of the most distinctive British parliamentary practices is the convention of the PMQs, or Prime Minister’s Questions. Taking place every Wednesday at noon while parliament is in session, “question time” consists of the prime minister directly answering queries from members of parliament. In general, the prime minister faces the leader of the opposition in a lively and combative debate to clarify the issues of the day, although the recent rise of third parties like Reform UK has altered the dynamics of this practice by moving the parliament away from a two-party system.

In Japan, the Diet Reform Law consciously introduced a similar convention called “party leader debates” (tōshu tōron) in 1999. At the time, the divisive domestic debate in Britain over policy toward the European Union often saw the leaders of the Conservative and Labour parties do battle during question time. In 1995, Prime Minister John Major was pursuing a pragmatic approach to EU issues, but his own Conservative Party was split between pro- and anti-EU factions. The rising political star of the time, the Labour Party’s Tony Blair, sensed weakness and during question time delivered one of the most famous political lines in modern British politics: “I lead my party; he follows his.”

Blair was extremely adept at using the PMQs to demonstrate his leadership qualities and readiness to take over the premiership. It was therefore little surprise when he eventually led the Labour Party to a landslide victory in the 1997 general election, at the age of 43 becoming one of the youngest prime ministers in the long history of British democracy. This was clearly what the Japanese political reformers of the 1990s, who viewed a two-party system as desirable, wanted to see in the Japanese version of this convention.

Hoping for More Meaningful Discussion?

Japan’s experience with question time over the last three decades years has not, however, seen its version develop into a forum for the ruling and opposition parties to debate issues of great national significance or help the public make decisions over who is best suited for leadership. The sessions are not regularly scheduled, time constraints are strict, and they tend to be performative in essence. In fact, prime ministers have continued to engage in what now appears to be a bizarre custom seemingly just to tick it off a list of things to do.

For example, the party leader debate held on May 20 this year was the first for some time. Even then, it swiftly devolved into a shambles. This is deeply worrying, as Japan faces considerable economic, fiscal, diplomatic, and national security challenges that require leadership to resolve divided public opinion and advance policy. On May 20, however, there was no “debate” to speak of. It felt more like the structured and ritualized questioning one usually sees in proceedings of a parliamentary committee.

This is in part due to the persistence in Japan of a single political party dominating general elections. The so-called “one strong, many weak” phenomenon means opposition parties still struggle to decisively communicate their ability to serve as a viable alternative to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Today, another reason for the weak presence of Japan’s opposition is the overpowering popularity of Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae.

While Takaichi’s top-line support levels remain robust, though, the nature of support for the prime minister is nevertheless changing. Regular surveys conducted by the political survey website Go2senkyo.com and the JX News Agency have found that since her inauguration as prime minister in November last year, the level of enthusiasm for Takaichi’s cabinet has dropped among the working-age generation (those in their twenties to fifties). In May, those who “strongly support” the government registered only 30%, down from 50% six months prior in this broad and critically important demographic.

The Politics That Really Matter

This decline in enthusiasm is also reflected in the changing reasons people give for continuing to support the cabinet. Many prior Japanese administrations took office with public support that was based simply on perceptions that they were either “better than the alternatives” or that the cabinet was drawn from the party that voters supported. However, when Prime Minister Takaichi took office, survey respondents indicated that they actually possessed “high expectations” for the prime minister, her cabinet, and its policy program. In other words, Takaichi enjoyed a high quality of support as well as a high quantity.

In the most recent surveys, however, the most commonly cited reason for supporting the Takaichi cabinet has reverted back to “it is better than the alternatives,” as high expectations for administration policies and trust in the character of the prime minister and cabinet have sunk by around a third from previous levels.

Changes in the intensity of support for the prime minister and cabinet can be quite important, even when overall support remains high. Previously, the Takaichi cabinet was able to overcome minor setbacks thanks to high expectations and levels of trust, giving her administration considerable momentum. If more people lose this sense of expectation or trust, the public will not view future challenges or problems faced by the government so generously.

The quiet defection of the working-age cohort is likely driven by economic conditions, particularly high inflation. The Takaichi administration took office promising bold action to address popular frustration with high prices that previous administrations were unable to resolve. For younger and working-age voters in particular, where a given political leader sits on the conservative-liberal ideological spectrum is not necessarily the most important factor for evaluation. Rather, they are more concerned about whether can expect tangible improvements in their livelihoods: Will wages rise? Will prices stop rising? Will tax and social insurance premium burdens lighten?

Same as the Old Boss?

Six months after taking office, the Takaichi administration has likely entered familiar territory for Japanese governments, where the support of the voting public is no longer based on expectations and aspirations. Rather, voters are appraising the current cabinet’s effectiveness based on their direct experiences and livelihoods. They do not feel the economy has improved. They do not believe measures against high prices have been strong enough. Their daily lives have not become easier. These sentiments will gradually erode the intensity of support for the administration, meaning topline support rates will be less resilient to future political setbacks or challenges.

This phenomenon is by no means unique to contemporary Japan. Soaring prices are an intractable enemy for any government. The Starmer administration in Britain and the Trump administration in the United States have all been compromised by the high price of daily necessities. In Japan, the administrations of Takaichi’s predecessors, Kishida Fumio and Ishiba Shigeru, were similarly hamstrung by growing voter dissatisfaction with inflation.

Much like the gradual rising of water levels in a pool, inflation that outpaces wage increases progressively makes voters’ daily lives more difficult. People of different stature will inevitably start drowning one after another unless the government of the day acts to save them. Unlike the Abe Shinzō administration, which battled deflationary pressures through aggressive fiscal and monetary policy, Takaichi faces a much more difficult task.

The current administration may appear unshakable, but the reality is quite different. If the opposition parties calmly analyze the changing nature of Takaichi’s support base, they will realize that the only path for them to win back public opinion is to present new ideas that rescue people from the problems of daily life currently washing over them. The public is not satisfied with the Takaichi administration; they simply cannot imagine a “better” alternative. Until opposition parties acknowledge the true needs of the public, the “one strong, many weak” phenomenon will continue to shape the Japanese political landscape.

(Originally published in Japanese on May 25, 2026. Banner photo: Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, standing at right, responds to a question from Ogawa Jun’ya, leader of the Centrist Reform Alliance, seated at left, during question time in the Japanese Diet on the afternoon of May 20, 2026. © Jiji.)