Calm Words from London

Confronting the “Worst-Case Scenario”

On March 11, 2011, an earthquake of unprecedented severity struck eastern Japan. The Pacific coast of the Tōhoku region (northern Honshū) suffered tremendous devastation from the quake and the tsunami that followed it, and large numbers of human lives were lost in just a short time. It was the worst disaster Japan has suffered since the end of World War II. And on top of this natural catastrophe, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (located about 220 kilometers north of central Tokyo) suffered damage that resulted in multiple system failures and the release of significant amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. People living in the Tokyo area came to feel rising alarm: Is it safe for us to stay here? Can Tokyo continue to serve as a major global city? What will become of Japan as a whole?

The Japanese government called for people living within a 20-kilometer radius of Fukushima Daiichi to evacuate and subsequently urged those at a distance of 20–30 kilometers to evacuate voluntarily. The question was whether areas farther from the plant, particularly the Tokyo area, would be in danger from radiation. While some foreign media organs were clearly exaggerating the extent of the radiation danger, the British government distinguished itself as one of the calmest in its response to this crisis.

On March 15, the Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies, an organ of Britain’s Department of Health, held a meeting of experts from inside and outside the government to discuss how to respond to the Fukushima Daiichi crisis. Chief Scientific Advisor Sir John Beddington (Imperial College London) explained the situation from a scientific perspective; his conclusion was that the scope of the evacuation advisory issued by the Japanese government was appropriate and that those living in Tokyo, even infants and pregnant women, would face no serious danger even under the worst-case scenario.

That same day, Beddington took part in a teleconference with the British ambassador in Tokyo and other Britons living in Japan; he presented his own calm assessment and answered a number of questions from other participants. On its website, the British embassy posted the transcript of this March 15 teleconference as well as one on March 18 and thereafter. These were widely read within Japan thanks to references on blogs and Twitter. His explanations gave many people confidence that they could stay in Tokyo and continue to go about their business as usual. Though the contents that Beddington presented were based on the same set of facts as the information released by the Japanese government, the authorities in Tokyo did not go so far as to provide a detailed, logical account taking the worst-case scenario into consideration. So for many, the message from London was probably more useful as a source of guidance. In addition, it seems to have provided food for thought for British journalists. So I am certain that it had a positive impact.

Unprepared to Deal with Multiple Emergencies

The setup that allowed the British government to respond so quickly and appropriately to the situation dates back to 2001, when Prime Minister Tony Blair’s administration established a Civil Contingencies Secretariat as an interdepartmental organ to deal with natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other emergencies. And in 2004 the complex mix of existing legislation was consolidated with the enactment of the Civil Contingencies Act. In this way Britain established both an administrative and a legal setup allowing it to deal promptly with diverse emergencies. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat has its own staff of more than 100 and is prepared to deal with large-scale disasters in 16 categories, including pandemic influenza, floods, and terrorism; it serves as the core of the government’s setup for dealing with disasters on the basis of expert knowledge. Japan has nothing to compare with this set of arrangements in terms of funding, organization, or legislation.

This lack led to inefficiency in the initial response to the March disaster. It was a compound catastrophe—earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant accident. The prime minister, chief cabinet secretary, and their fellow leaders and staff members at the Kantei (the prime minister’s residence and executive office) are limited in number, and it is hard for them to provide political direction in dealing with multiple critical situations at the same time. The government was quick to deploy 100,000 members of the Self-Defense Forces to take part in the rescue and relief effort in Tōhoku, but it was unable to deal promptly with the nuclear power plant crisis, and there was a lack of coordination among the Kantei, Tokyo Electric Power Company (the private-sector operator of Fukushima Daiichi), and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (a regulatory organ under the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry). We also saw much clumsiness in the liaison between the national government and local authorities. The government does not seem to have been prepared to deal with this sort of compound emergency.

The government can save lives and it can cause lives to be lost. Through its actions it can do much to prevent needless deaths. The response of the current administration was much smoother in many ways than that of the government at the time of the earthquake that struck Kobe and its environs in 1995. But it showed considerable uncertainty and confusion in dealing with the unprecedented nuclear plant crisis. Though we may not wish to think about the possibility of major accidents at nuclear power plants, that does not mean that they will not happen. There should have been better understanding of the seriousness of the risks involved in large-scale nuclear contamination resulting from such an accident. Part of the job of our government leaders is “to think the unthinkable.” I hope that the lessons of this disaster will serve as the basis for a major upgrading of Japan’s official setup for dealing with emergencies.

(Originally written in Japanese on April 1, 2011.)